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ABSTRACT. The President’s Council on Bioethics has addressed the moral status
of human preembryos in its reports on stem cell research and human therapeutic
cloning. Although the Council has been criticized for being hand-picked to favor the
right-to-life viewpoint concerning human preembryos, it has embraced the idea that
the right-to-life position should be defended in secular terms. This is an important
feature of the Council’s work, and it demonstrates a recognition of the need for
genuine engagement between opposing sides in the debate over stem cell research. To
promote this engagement, the Council has stated in secular terms several arguments
for the personhood of human preembryos. This essay presents and critiques those
arguments, and it concludes that they are unsuccessful. If the best arguments in
support of the personhood of human preembryos have been presented by the
Council, then there are no reasonable secular arguments in support of that view.
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Controversy over stem cell research arises from the fact that
obtaining stem cells involves destruction of human preembryos.
1
Some maintain that human preembryos have full moral standing and
that killing them is murder. Others hold either that preembryos have
no moral standing or that they have an intermediate status that
permits their destruction in at least some circumstances. Those who
regard preembryos as persons often base this view on religious beliefs.
The question arises as to how, in our pluralistic culture, we should
arrive at public policy concerning this contentious issue. One ap-
proach is to strive for genuine engagement between the opposing
factions, an engagement in which each side presents arguments and is
open to their critique.
2 Although the President’s Council on Bioethics
has been criticized for being stacked in favor of the right-to-life
viewpoint,
3 it has promoted engagement by setting forth several
arguments, stated in secular terms, in defense of the view that pre-
embryos are persons. In doing so, it has endorsed the idea that all
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arguments and that public policy formation should be approached
through critical examination of opposing arguments. In this paper, I
shall attempt to state and critique the arguments the Council has
presented.
Two main arguments can be found, one of which is presented in
Monitoring Stem Cell Research. This report claims not to be advo-
cating the various arguments it presents, including the argument in
question. As the report states:
...our purpose is not ﬁnally to assess the validity of the competing claims or to arrive
at a conclusion, but—in line with the Council’s charge to monitor developments in
this area—to present them more or less as they have appeared in the public debates
of the past several years.
4
In Human Cloning and Human Dignity, a second argument can be
found, not in the body of the report, but in a personal statement in an
appendix. Most of the Council members wrote a personal statement
that was attached to the end of the report. The statement in question
was authored by Robert P. George and joined by Alfonso Go ´ mez-
Lobo.
5 Again, the Council as a whole should not be regarded as
advocating the argument in question, although it is clear that George
and Go ´ mez-Lobo support it. Each of these arguments will be con-
sidered in turn.
THE ARGUMENT FROM IDENTITY THROUGH
BIOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
The argument in the stem cell report claims that there is identity
between a preembryo and the adult who develops from that preem-
bryo and that the identity is based on the continuity of the devel-
opmental process. I shall call it the argument based on identity
through biological continuity. The report states:
Many of those who seek to defend human embryos base their case on some form of
the argument for biological continuity and sameness through time. ...Every adult
human being around us, they argue, is the same individual who, at an earlier stage of
life, was a human embryo.
6
The argument concludes that personhood begins with fertilization,
based in part on the view that there is no point during development
following fertilization at which it is reasonable to claim that the
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on to state:
This view holds that only the very beginning of a new (embryonic) life can serve as a
reasonable boundary line in according moral worth to a human organism, because it
is the moment marked out by nature for the ﬁrst visible appearance in the world of a
new individual. Before fertilization, no new individual exists. After it, sperm and egg
cells are gone—subsumed and transformed into a new, third entity capable of its own
internally self-directed development. ...
All further stages and events in embryological development, they argue, are discrete
labels applied to an organism that is persistently itself even as it continuously
changes in its dimensions, scope, degree of differentiation, and so on. ...
...[I]n the view of these commentators no discrete point in time or development
would seem to give any justiﬁcation for assuming that the embryo in question was
one thing at one point and then suddenly became something different (turning, for
example, from non-human to human or from non-person to person).
7
For the purpose of critically examining the argument, it will be
helpful to lay out its main premises and conclusion. I suggest that
they can reasonably be stated as follows:
(1) Either personhood begins with fertilization or there is a change in
identity during development after fertilization.
8
(2) If there is a change in identity during development after fertil-
ization, then there is a discrete point in time or development after
fertilization at which a change in identity suddenly occurs.
(3) There is no discrete point in time or development after fertiliza-
tion at which a change in identity suddenly occurs.
(2), (3), therefore:
(4) There is no change in identity during development after fertil-
ization.
(1), (4), therefore:
(5) Personhood begins with fertilization.
Critique
Let me begin my critique by noting what seems quite plausible in the
argument. Many would agree that premise (3) is true. Even among
those who hold that personhood requires the acquisition of some
characteristic, or set of characteristics, during development (e.g.,
sentience, brain activity, or self-consciousness, among other possi-
bilities), many would agree that the relevant characteristic or set does
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the claim that there is no discontinuity of this sort.
There are, however, some problems with the argument. Some
might ﬁnd fault with premise (1). That premise assumes that if there is
a change from nonperson to person during development, then there is
a change in identity. In reply, an alternative view is that the organism
can become a person without changing its identity. The issue in
question can be described using the distinction between a ‘‘phase
sortal’’ and a ‘‘proper sortal.’’ A sortal is a predicate that tells us the
type of thing an entity is. A phase sortal is a characteristic that an
entity has during a stage of its existence.
9 A standard example is
‘‘adolescent.’’ A proper sortal tells us what an entity is throughout its
existence. It is a matter of debate as to whether personhood is a phase
sortal or a proper sortal. Some have defended the view that person-
hood is a phase sortal, and presumably they would reject premise
(1).
10 I shall not pursue that line of criticism here because it is even
more clear that there is a serious difficulty with premise (2). It should
be noted, however, that premise (1) makes a rather significant
undefended assumption. In the remainder of my discussion of the
argument from identity through biological continuity, I shall accept
the assumption, for sake of argument, that a change from nonperson
to person would involve a change in identity.
Premise (2) claims that any change in identity must occur sud-
denly, at a discrete point in time or development. In reply, an alter-
native view is that change in identity can occur gradually and
continuously over time. Speciﬁcally, many hold that personhood is
acquired later in development, with the acquisition of some charac-
teristic or set of characteristics that develops gradually and contin-
uously, as opposed to arising suddenly at a discrete point. On the
assumption that a change from nonperson to person is a change in
identity, this would be a gradual change in identity. Moreover, there
seems to be no plausible reason to reject the view that an entity can
change into something else gradually. Consider, for example, the fact
that a small mound of iron ﬁlings can gradually become a mound of
iron oxide, or rust. It would be reasonable to hold that when this
happens, a change in identity occurs; after all, iron is not identical to
iron oxide because the two types of substances have different chem-
ical compositions. Furthermore, there is no nonarbitrary point in
time that can be identiﬁed as ‘‘the point at which the mound changed
from iron ﬁlings to rust.’’ The same can be said concerning a bio-
logical entity’s changing from one stage of development to another,
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into a fetus, but there is no discrete point in time or development at
which this suddenly occurs. If there can be a gradual change from one
stage of an entity to another, why cannot there be a gradual change
from being one entity to being a different entity? The fact is, we have
a clear intuition that an entity can come into being gradually. As
Warren Quinn puts it:
...[T]he coming to be of a new individual is the passive equivalent of the making
process. If a builder’s making a house or mother nature’s making a human being are
genuine processes taking time then so too are the coming to be of a house or human
being.
11
If a house-under-construction can gradually become a house, then
why cannot a developing human organism gradually become a hu-
man being, or gradually become a person?
It might be objected that if coming into existence is a gradual
process, then we do not have a good way to describe the ontological
status of the entity during the process. Does it partially exist? Does it
not yet exist? If it partially exists, how are we to make sense of partial
existence? If it does not yet exist, when does it begin to exist?
12 In
reply, the fact that one can raise puzzling questions is no grounds for
denying the reality that gives rise to the questions. For example,
puzzling questions can be raised about the relationship between mind
and body. Do physical events in the brain cause mental events? If so,
how? Are mental events identical to physical events? A lack of con-
sensus concerning the answers to these questions is no reason to deny
that there is a close relationship of some sort between physical events
and mental events. Moreover, similar puzzling questions can be
raised in regard to something as mundane as house building. Is a
house-under-construction a house that has partial existence? If not,
when does the house begin to exist? If there is no obvious answer to
these questions, that is not a reason to hold that houses do not come
into existence gradually. The idea that houses suddenly come into
existence would be absurd (especially to those who have dealt with
house builders).
In summary, the argument from identity through biological con-
tinuity claims that if the developing organism changes from non-
person to person following fertilization, then there must be a change
in identity that occurs at a speciﬁc point in time or development. In
reply, I have pointed out that the argument has not defended its
assumption that a change from nonperson to person involves a
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change in identity, it must occur at a distinct point in time or
development. For these reasons, especially the latter, the argument
should be rejected.
THE ARGUMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY
A second argument is put forward in the personal statement by
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo.
13 This argument, which makes use of the
Aristotelian concepts of ‘‘essential property’’ and ‘‘active potential-
ity,’’ has been referred to as the argument from substantial identity.
14
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo maintain that the developing human
organism is a member of the natural kind human being. This mem-
bership holds at all stages of development because at all stages the
organism possesses the essential characteristic of human beings. This
essential property is identified by George and Go ´ mez-Lobo as ‘‘the
basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental func-
tions.’’ This capacity is a potentiality to develop into an organism
that exhibits mental characteristics such as self-consciousness and
rationality. It is distinguished by George and Go ´ mez-Lobo from an
‘‘immediately exercisable capacity’’ for self-consciousness and ratio-
nality. The latter is the capacity for mental functions that is actually
exercised by humans who are far enough advanced in development to
exhibit such functions. In their words:
Of course, human beings in the embryonic, fetal, and early infant stages lack
immediately exercisable capacies for mental functions characteristically carried out
(though intermittently) by most...human beings at later stages of maturity. Still, they
possess in radical (= root) form these very capacities. Precisely by virtue of the kind
of entity they are, they are from the beginning actively developing themselves to the
stages at which these capacities will (if all goes well) be immediately exercisable....As
humans, they are members of a natural kind—the human species—whose embryonic,
fetal, and infant members, if not prevented by some extrinsic cause, develop in due
course and by intrinsic self-direction the immediately exercisable capacity for char-
acteristically human mental functions. Each new human being comes into existence
possessing the internal resources to develop immediately exercisable characteristi-
cally human mental capacities—and only the adverse effects on them of other causes
will prevent their full development. In this sense, even human beings in the embry-
onic, fetal, and infant stages have the basic natural capacity for characteristically
human mental functions.
15
The concept of an essential property can be understood for pur-
poses of this discussion as the following: it is a property such that if
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times that one exists, and if one loses it, one ceases to exist. An
essential property deﬁnes the type of substance a thing is. According
to the view in question, the type of substance we are is ‘‘human
being,’’ or to state it differently, we are essentially human beings.
16 In
the view of George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, an equivalent way to state this
is to say that we are essentially human organisms, for they hold that
the human organism from the zygote stage forward is a human being.
They hold that each of us used to be a preembryo because the pre-
embryo from which we developed has the same essential property we
have—a basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental
functions.
17
The argument also maintains that all human beings deserve full
respect, and because preembryos are human beings, they deserve full
respect. As George and Go ´ mez-Lobo put it:
To deny that embryonic human beings deserve full respect, one must suppose that
not every whole living human being is deserving of full respect. To do that, one must
hold that those human beings who deserve full respect deserve it not in virtue of the
kind of entity they are, but, rather in virtue of some acquired characteristic that some
human beings (or human beings at some stages) have and others do not, and which
some human beings have in greater degree than others. We submit that this position
is untenable.
18
The argument draws upon a distinction between active and
passive potentiality, which in turn is based on an interpretation of
Aristotle’s discussion of potentiality. The term ‘‘active potentiality’’
is used when development of the potential is caused by factors that
are internal to the entity undergoing change; by contrast, ‘‘passive
potentiality’’ refers to a potential to undergo change as a result of
factors that entirely are outside the entity being changed.
19
Moreover, Aristotle is interpreted as holding that ‘‘active potenti-
ality’’ applies in cases where the identity of the entity undergoing
change is preserved throughout the change.
20 For George and
Go ´ mez-Lobo, a ‘‘basic natural capacity’’ is an active potentiality,
for, as they state, the human organism has the ‘‘internal resources’’
needed for development. They are referring to the fact that the
development process is caused by genetic factors within the
organism. The notion that human development is accurately de-
scribed by the Aristotelian concept of active potentiality is taken to
support their claim that identity is preserved across all stages of
human development.
21
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potential.’’ An earlier version of the argument from potential had
held that a potentiality for personhood endows any organism pos-
sessing such potentiality with personhood even now.
22 A standard
objection to this early version points out that it is based on a logical
mistake. If A is potentially B, then it follows that A is not B. If
preembryos are potential persons, it follows that preembryos are not
persons yet.
23 Thus, the early version clearly is mistaken, but the
argument by George and Go ´ mez-Lobo avoids this difficulty. Instead
of claiming that self-consciousness gives rise to moral standing and
that preembryos have a potential for self-consciousness, it claims that
it is the potentiality itself that gives rise to moral standing—that is,
the basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental func-
tions is the basis for moral standing. Given this version of the
argument from potential, the truth of the statement ‘‘If A is poten-
tially B, then A is not B’’ is beside the point, or at least that is what
the proponents of the argument would have us believe.
As before, a critical examination of the argument will be facilitated
by laying out the main premises and conclusion. It turns out that
there is more than one way to take the ideas in the argument of
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo and arrange them into numbered premises.
I am going to present two main ways of stating their argument. The
ﬁrst way emphasizes the concept of personal identity:
(1) A human preembryo is the same entity as the adult human being
into which it develops.
(2) If an individual is the same entity as a human being, then it is a
human being.
(1), (2), therefore:
(3) A human preembryo is a human being.
(4) All human beings deserve full respect.
(3), (4), therefore:
(5) A human preembryo deserves full respect.
A second way that one can state their argument emphasizes the
concept of essential property:
(1¢) A human preembryo possesses the same essential property, a
basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental
functions, as the adult human being into which it develops.
(2¢) Whatever has the same essential property as a human being is a
human being.
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(3¢) A human preembryo is a human being.
(4¢) All human beings deserve full respect.
(3¢), (4¢), therefore:
(5¢) A human preembryo deserves full respect.
Critique
Let us turn to a critique of these arguments, beginning with the ﬁrst
version. There is a difﬁculty with premise (1), which holds that the
human preembryo is the same entity as the adult into which it
develops. An argument against premise (1) is based on facts about
embryological development. At approximately two weeks following
fertilization, the preembryo develops into an entity that consists of
the embryo proper and the trophoblast. The embryo proper—that is,
the embryo—develops from the inner cell mass, which forms into two
cell layers during approximately ten to fourteen days after fertiliza-
tion. These layers initially are shaped roughly like a circular disc, but
they progressively become ovoid. At about the fourteenth day, the
primitive streak begins to form at one end of the long axis of this
ovoid. That end will become the hind-end of the embryonic axis and
the opposite will be the fore-end, where development of the head
eventually will occur. The formation of the embryo begins with the
appearance of this axis. By contrast, the trophoblast is the outer part
of the blastocyst, and it is the part of the preembryo that will become
placenta and membranes. At the stage in question—when the embryo
has begun to be formed—the preembryo is the entire collection of
cells consisting of the embryo and the trophoblast. The entity that
began as a zygote, then became a two-celled entity, then four-celled,
and so on, becomes the entire collection of cells in question. But the
embryo is not identical to the entire collection of cells, for it consists
of only part of the entire collection. Therefore, the preembryo is not
identical to the embryo. Moreover, it is the embryo that develops into
the fetus. The placenta and membranes are not part of the fetus. They
are extrafetal structures that provide oxygen, nutrition, and protec-
tion from infection, among other functions. The preembryo’s lack of
identity with the embryo entails its lack of identity with the fetus.
And if it is not identical to the fetus, then it is not identical to the
infant or adult. This lack of identity means that premise (1) is
incorrect. This version of the argument by George and Go ´ mez-Lobo
is unsuccessful.
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upon which premise (1) is based has to do with the nature of the
preembryo’s potential. One can make a distinction between two
senses of potentiality: the potential of an entity to bring about change
to itself; and the potential of an entity to change into something else.
The view in question interprets the preembryo’s potential as the
former type—an identity-preserving potential. However, the preem-
bryo’s potential to cause the formation of the embryo and tropho-
blast is the latter type—a nonidentity potential.
24 This also illustrates
the problem with accepting as dogma the view that active potentiality
is always identity-preserving. Clearly, the preembryo is not identical
to the embryo, and just as clearly the preembryo has an active
potentiality, in the sense that its development is controlled primarily
from within. Through an active potentiality, the preembryo becomes
something that is different from itself.
It might be objected that the trophoblast is part of the embryo and
that the placenta and membranes are part of the fetus. On this view,
the placenta and membranes are fetal organs and are part of the
fetus’s body until birth, when they are discarded. Their relationship
to the body might be thought of as analogous to hair and nail clip-
pings, which are part of the body until they are clipped. According to
this perspective, the postimplantaion embryo is not what embryolo-
gists call the embryo, but rather it is the trophoblast together with
what embryologists call the embryo. This view permits one to
maintain that the preembryo is identical to the embryo, albeit with a
new concept of what constitutes the embryo. In reply, although one
could adopt this ontological viewpoint, doing so would have a cost, in
that it commits one to views that are counterintuitive. Our ordinary
way of talking about the fetus and placenta seems to reflect a more
intuitive understanding about how to divide the world into separate
entities. On this more plausible view, the placenta is a separate
structure, which is connected to the fetus by the umbilical cord. If we
were to abandon this way of thinking about the fetus and placenta,
we would find that we have to make alterations in other areas as well.
Consider, for example, those cases of twins in which there is one
placenta, to which each twin is attached.
25 On the view in question,
for each twin, the placenta is part of its body. So for every case of
twins like this, we would have to think of them as being conjoined
twins, since they share part of each other’s body. Again, this is
counterintuitive; we think of normal twins in such cases as having
completely separate bodies. And the view in question would also hold
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minor surgery, when the umbilical cords are cut. This too is an
implausible view, and it underscores the cost of adopting the meta-
physics in question—it commits one to views that are at odds with
our intuitive way of dividing the world into distinct entities.
Another version of the objection would hold that although the
placenta and membranes are not part of the fetus, the trophoblast
nevertheless is part of the embryo. On this view, as the trophoblast
continues to develop, it eventually gives rise to a new entity, the pla-
centaandmembranes.Thisviewpermitsonetoholdthattheentitythat
develops into the fetus is the combination of the trophoblast and what
embryologists call the embryo. This allows one to claim that the pre-
embryo is identical to the fetus and that the placenta and membranes
are a separate entity. In reply, this version also commits one to views
that arecounterintuitive. Forone thing,it isat oddswith the standard,
andhighlyplausible,viewthattheembryo(thatis,whatembryologists
call the embryo) develops into the fetus and that the trophoblast
developsintotheplacentaandmembranes.Theviewinquestionholds,
rather,thatthecombinationofthetrophoblastandwhatembryologists
call the embryo develops into the fetus and that the trophoblast also
develops into the placenta and membranes. This view is confusing and
is less straightforward and intuitive than the standard view. Another
problem arises from the fact that in some cases involving identical
twins, two embryonic discs arise from the inner cell mass. The view in
questioncommitsonetosayingthat,eventhoughthediscsareseparate
anddistinct,theyareinfactconjoinedtwins,becausethetrophoblastis
part of each. It also commits one to saying that later in development,
when the placenta(s) and membranes become separate entities, the
twins cease being conjoined. This is an unnecessarily complicated and
odd way to describe the entities in question.
Let us turn to the second version of George and Go ´ mez-Lobo’s
argument. In this version, a serious problem arises concerning pre-
mise (1¢). This premise asserts that normal human adults have a basic
natural capacity for characteristically human mental functions. It
seems clear that George and Go ´ mez-Lobo embrace this idea. After
all, they hold that the human organism at all stages of development
possesses a basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental
functions. That they regard this basic natural capacity as a potenti-
ality is made clear in the following passage, which discusses the dif-
ference between a basic natural capacity and an immediately
exercisable capacity:
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stages along a continuum. The proximate, or immediately exercisable, capacity for
mental functions is only the development of an underlying potentiality that the human
being possesses simply by virtue of the kind of entity it is.
26
Thus, in their view all human beings, including adults, possess the
potentiality to develop an immediately exercisable capacity for self-
consciousness. The fact that their argument implies this is hidden
from view, to some extent, by the fact that they usually use the term
‘‘capacity’’ as a substitute for the term ‘‘potentiality.’’ But indeed, the
argument from substantial identity implies that normal human adults
have a potential to become self-conscious. That implication seems
rather odd. If Professor George were to walk into class and announce
that he has the potential to become self-conscious, his students would
hardly know what to make of that comment; perhaps they would
think that he is making a joke, because the statement implies that he
is not self-conscious. As pointed out above, it is indeed part of the
logic of the term ‘‘potentiality’’ that if A has the potentiality to be-
come B, then A is not B. However, the argument from substantial
identity asserts that normal human adults, like normal human pre-
embryos, possess a potentiality to become self-conscious individuals.
But the fact is, normal human adults do not have such a potential-
ity—they are self-conscious. In their case, potentiality has become
actuality.
So, it turns out that the logical point remains relevant. Moreover,
it is clear that the logical point is correct, and we can see this simply
by considering an example. For A let us substitute ‘‘a human pre-
embryo,’’ and for B let us substitute ‘‘an individual with an imme-
diately exercisable capacity for characteristically human mental
functions.’’ Clearly, a human preembryo with a basic natural capacity
(a potential) to become an individual with an immediately exercisable
capacity for characteristically human mental functions is not now an
individual with that immediately exercisable capacity.
To underscore the objection I am making, let us keep the same
substitution for B as above. This yields the following true statement:
If A has the potentiality to become an individual with an immediately exercisable
capacity for characteristically human mental functions, then A is not an individual
with an immediately exercisable capacity for characteristically human mental func-
tions.
For A let us now substitute ‘‘a normal awake human adult.’’ In
this material implication, if we consider the consequent alone
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ately exercisable capacity for characteristically human mental func-
tions), we see that the consequent is false. If we apply modus
tollens,
27 we obtain:
It is false that a normal awake human adult has the potentiality to become an
individual with an immediately exercisable capacity for characteristically human
mental functions.
Therefore, it is not true that preembryos and adults have in
common the ‘‘basic natural capacity for characteristically human
mental functions.’’ Hence, premise (1¢) is false, and moreover, the
metaphysics that is based on the notion that preembryos and adults
alike have this property is mistaken.
28
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS BY GEORGE AND
GOMEZ-LOBO
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo give several arguments in defense of the
view that moral standing is based on possession of the basic natural
capacity, as opposed to the immediately exercisable capacity, for
characteristically human mental functions. Let us turn to an exami-
nation of those arguments.
Argument from the moral standing of infants
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo point out that infants do not have an
immediately exercisable capacity for the sort of mental functions in
question, and they claim that grounding moral standing on an
immediately exercisable capacity rather than a basic natural capacity
commits one to the view that infants do not have moral standing.
29
One problem with this argument is that George and Go ´ mez-Lobo
mischaracterize the views of their opponents. Those who hold that
moral standing arises later in development do not generally hold that
self-consciousness must be immediately exercisable in order for one to
have moral standing. Such a view does not account for those who
have previously been self-conscious but now are reversibly un-
conscious, such as those who are asleep, anesthetized, or reversibly
comatose. Even putting aside this mischaracterization, the argument
is unsuccessful because it assumes that the only way to justify the
moral standing of an individual is by appeal to inherent character-
istics. This assumption overlooks the distinction between intrinsic
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30 Self-conscious individuals are ends
in themselves in the literal sense that they have the ability to choose
their own ends, plans, and values. These inherent characteristics give
them what is called intrinsic moral standing. A number of authors
have argued that it is justifiable to confer full moral standing upon
infants although they lack the inherent characteristics upon which
intrinsic moral standing is based.
31 These authors generally argue
that infants are similar enough, in morally relevant ways, to indi-
viduals who have intrinsic moral standing to justify conferring full
moral standing upon them. Thus, George and Gomez-Lobo are
mistaken in implying that those who reject their view are committed
to holding that infants lack full moral standing.
Argument from degree of development
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo claim that the difference between a pre-
embryo and an adult is that the adult’s basic natural capacity is more
developed than the preembryo’s. The degree of development of this
capacity can be regarded as a feature of the developing human. The
degree of development increases gradually, and the adult has more of
this feature than the preembryo. George and Go ´ mez-Lobo maintain
that a difference in moral standing cannot be based on the fact that
one has more of this feature than the other. In their words:
A mere quantitative difference (having more or less of the same feature, such as the
development of a basic natural capacity) cannot by itself be a justificatory basis for
treating different entities in radically different ways. Between the ovum and the
approaching thousands of sperm, on the one hand, and the embryonic human being,
on the other hand, there is a clear difference in kind. But between the embryonic
human being and that same human being at any later stage of its maturation, there is
only a difference in degree.
32
In reply, let me put aside the problem, pointed out above, that it
is false to claim that self-conscious humans have the potential to
become self-conscious. The point to be made here is that the jus-
tiﬁcatory argument George and Go ´ mez-Lobo attribute to their
opponents is not in fact the argument that the opponents make. The
opponents claim that the difference in moral standing is based on
the fact that adults possess characteristics that preembryos lack, not
that they possess some feature to a greater degree. Moreover, let us
assume for sake of argument that adults have the feature in ques-
tion (i.e., development of the basic natural capacity) to a greater
degree than preembryos. Because their opponents do not assert the
CARSON STRONG 446argument in question, the most that George and Go ´ mez-Lobo can
reasonably claim is that it is an implication of their opponents’
position that some individuals with full moral standing possess the
feature to a greater degree than some individuals that lack full
moral standing. But there is nothing wrong with this implication. It
seems clear that some individuals with full moral standing possess
some characteristics to a greater degree than some individuals that
lack full moral standing. Consider a cross-species comparison.
Different animal species have a capacity for mental functions, al-
though the magnitude of the developed capacity in adults is greater
for some species than for others. We can describe this by saying
that the capacity differs in degree across species. Adult humans
have a capacity for mental functions to a greater degree than adult
cats, for example. Moreover, adult humans have full moral standing
and cats do not. Thus, individuals with full moral standing can
possess some characteristics to a greater degree than some individ-
uals that lack full moral standing.
33
Argument from degrees of self-consciousness
George and Go ´ mez-Lobo claim that the immediately exercisable
capacity in question admits of degrees—that different humans
possess different degrees of self-consciousness, intelligence, and
rationality. If moral standing is based on a capacity that admits of
degrees, they claim, then ‘‘no account could be given of why basic
rights are not possessed by human beings in varying degrees’’ and
therefore some self-conscious people would have higher moral
standing and stronger rights than others.
34 In reply, those who hold
that intrinsic moral standing is based on the possession of self-
consciousness hold that all individuals who reach a minimum
threshhold of self-consciousness have inherent moral standing and
have it to the same degree. The claim by George and Go ´ mez-Lobo
that no account can be given in support of this threshhold concept
is simply false. A number of commentators have provided such
accounts. For some, a key concept is moral agency. All who meet
the threshhold are moral agents and, as such, are members of the
moral community with equal claim to moral standing.
35 Others
emphasize the concept of being an end in oneself. All who meet the
threshhold are ends in themselves because they have the ability to
choose their own ends.
36
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It is good that those who hold the right-to-life view concerning hu-
man preembryos attempt to formulate, in secular terms, arguments in
support of their view; doing so permits a dialogue concerning the
reasonableness of opposing views. I have presented objections to
the argument based on identity through biological continuity and the
argument from substantial identity. These objections point to serious
problems with the arguments and show that neither argument is
successful. The lack of identity between the preembryo and the hu-
man organism at later stages of development is especially signiﬁcant
for stem cell research. Stem cells, to date at least, are derived from
preembryos, not embryos. The main arguments for preembryo per-
sonhood rely on an identity that does not exist. This means that no
reasonable secular arguments have been made supporting the view
that it is wrong to obtain stem cells from preembryos.
NOTES
1 In the debate over stem cell research, the term ‘‘embryo’’ is often used, and ref-
erence is made to the destruction of embryos. In this paper, I use the term ‘‘pre-
embryo’’ to refer to the conceptus from the time of fertilization until the formation of
the primitive streak, at approximately fourteen days following fertilization. By
contrast, the embryo proper begins to exist with the formation of the embryonic
plate and the primitive streak. The need to distinguish the preembryo from the
embryo proper will become apparent later in the essay.
2 Carson Strong, ‘‘Those Divisive Stem Cells: Dealing with Our Most Contentious
Issues,’’ American Journal of Bioethics 2 (Winter 2002): 39–40.
3 Elizabeth Blackburn, ‘‘Bioethics and the Political Distortion of Biomedical Sci-
ence,’’ New England Journal of Medicine 350 (2004): 1379–1380.
4 The President’s Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2004), p. 54.
5 Robert P. George and Alfonzo Go ´ mez-Lobo, ‘‘Statement of Professor George
(JoinedbyDr.Go ´ mez-Lobo),’’inThePresident’sCouncilonBioethics,HumanCloning
and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry (Washington, D.C., 2002), pp. 258–266.
6 President’s Council, Monitoring Stem Cell Research, cited in n. 4 above, p. 76.
7 President’s Council, Monitoring Stem Cell Research, cited in n. 4 above, pp. 76–77.
8 When I use the expression ‘‘a change in identity,’’ I refer to the ceasing to exist of
one entity and the coming into being of another entity.
9 These concepts can be found in David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 24. Instead of ‘‘phase sortal’’ and
‘‘proper sortal,’’ Wiggins uses the terms ‘‘phased-sortal’’ and ‘‘substance-concept.’’
10 Dean Stretton, ‘‘The Argument from Intrinsic Value: A Critique,’’ Bioethics 14
(2000): 228–239, at 233.
CARSON STRONG 44811 Warren Quinn, ‘‘Abortion: Identity and Loss,’’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 13
(1984): 24–54, at 35. Similarly, Lawrence Becker holds that ‘‘entry into the class of
human beings is a process,’’ in ‘‘Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept,’’
Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1975): 334–359, at 335.
12 ThesesortsofquestionsareraisedbyWarrenQuinn,citedinn.11above,pp.34–39.
13 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in n. 5 above.
14 See, e.g., Patrick Lee, ‘‘The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A
Defense,’’ Bioethics 18 (2004): 249–263.
15 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in n. 5, above, p. 260.
16 Explicit use of the Aristotelian term ‘‘substance’’ and the distinction between
‘‘essential’’ and ‘‘accidental’’ characteristics is not made in the personal statement
(note 5 above), but can be found in Robert P. George and Patrick Lee, ‘‘Acorns and
Embryos,’’ The New Atlantis, 7 (Fall 2004/Winter 2005): 90–100, at 94; and Robert
P. George, ‘‘The Ethics of Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning,’’
Family Research Council: Defending Faith, Family, and Freedom, Issue No. 87,
available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?I=PD02D5&v=PRINT, at p. 7 of 10.
17 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo use the term ‘‘embryo’’ rather than ‘‘preembryo.’’
18 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in n. 5, above, pp. 259–260.
19 See, e.g., Alfonso Go ´ mez-Lobo, ‘‘On Potentiality and Respect for Embryos: A
Reply to Mary Mahowald,’’ Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2005): 105–110,
at 106.
20 See, e.g., Massimo Reichlin, ‘‘The Argument from Potential: A Reappraisal,’’
Bioethics 11 (1997): 1–23, at 4; Jason T. Eberl, ‘‘Aquinas’s Account of Human
Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations,’’ Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
30(2005): 379–394.
21 Others argue in a similar manner. See, e.g., Reichlin, cited in note 20 above. See
also A. Chadwick Ray, ‘‘Humanity, Personhood and Abortion,’’ International
Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1985): 233–245; Robert E. Joyce, ‘‘Personhood and the
Conception Event,’’ The New Scholasticism 52 (1978): 97–109. The term ‘‘basic
natural capacity’’ need not be interpreted as implying that the cause of change is
entirely internal, but can be understood as implying only that the cause has a very
signiﬁcant internal component. After all, the development of the preembryo into an
adult is not caused by factors entirely inside the organism. For example, a woman’s
uterus is necessary, and the embryo proper is nourished and oxygenated by the
placenta. Proponents of the argument in question recognize that there are external as
well as internal causes in embryogenesis. See, e.g., Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in n. 19 above,
p. 106.
22 For a statement of the earlier version, see, e.g., Reichlin, cited in n. 20 above, pp.
1–2. See also Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1979), p. 119.
23 See, e.g., H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 111.
24 A similar distinction is made by Stephen Buckle, who refers to the two types
of potential as ‘‘potential to become’’ and ‘‘potential to produce,’’ in ‘‘Arguing
from Potential,’’ Bioethics 2 (1988): 227–253. I use the terms ‘‘identity-preserving
potential’’ and ‘‘nonidentity potential’’ from Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing:
Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 304.
PREEMBRYO PERSONHOOD 44925 A single placenta can be present in cases involving monozygotic (‘‘identical’’) or
dizygotic (‘‘fraternal’’) twins. When monozygotic twins result from cleavage of the
preembryo during approximately three to eight days after fertilization, having a
single placenta is a common occurrence. When cleavage occurs soon after the eighth
day, there can also be a single set of membranes, referred to as monoamniotic and
monochorionic twins. See, e.g., F. Gary Cunningham, Paul C. McDonald, Norman
F. Gant, et al., Williams Obstetrics, 20th Edition (Stamford, CT: Appleton & Lange,
1997), pp 861–863.
26 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in n. 5 above, p. 261, emphasis added.
27 The form of argument, modus tollens, is as follows:
if p, then q
~q
therefore
~p
28 There is an argument by Go ´ mez-Lobo that might be regarded as a reply to this
objection. In discussing the logical point in question—if A is potentially B, then A is
not B—he claims that this point might not always be true. He suggests that its truth
might depend on whether B is a phase sortal or a proper sortal. He claims that if the
substitution for B is a phase sortal, then the logical point is true. But if the substi-
tution for B is a proper sortal, he states, ‘‘it is not clear whether the dictum is true or
not....’’ See Alfonso Go ´ mez-Lobo, ‘‘Does Respect for Embryos Entail Respect for
Gametes?’’ Theoretical Medicine 25 (2004): 199–208, at 205.
In reply, if we assume for sake of argument that these claims by Go ´ mez-Lobo are
correct, they do not constitute a rebuttal to the objection in question. The reason is
that, in Go ´ mez-Lobo’s own view, what I have substituted for B in the above argu-
ment—‘‘an individual with an immediately exercisable capacity for characteristically
human mental function’’ —is a phase sortal. He holds that the immediately exer-
cisable capacity is an accidental property, not an essential property. Thus, in his
view, the ‘‘dictum,’’ as I use it in the example in the text, is true.
In his attempt to reject the logical point, Go ´ mez-Lobo also makes the following
argument:
In other words, if A is potentially B (a thinking and self-conscious being) it does not
follow that A is not B. It follows that it is indeed B (a thinking and conscious being),
but surely not a fully developed one. If we should respect B, then we should also
respect A because it has the same properties that lead us to respect B, only at an
earlier stage of development. The potentiality of an embryo, then, is not the
potentiality to become a person. It is the potentiality of a person fully to actualize the
capacities that we associate with adult persons. (pp. 205–206)
In reply, the argument in the above passage is fallacious. The problem is that
there is an equivocation of the expression ‘‘a thinking and self-conscious being.’’ In
the sense in which A is potentially B, the expression is being used as equivalent to
something like ‘‘an individual who is a thinking and self-conscious being.’’ In the
sense in which A is B, the expression is equivalent to something like ‘‘a type of
being adult members of which are thinking and self-conscious.’’ Using the former
meaning, if A is potentially B, then A is not B. For Go ´ mez-Lobo simply to assert
CARSON STRONG 450otherwise would be question begging, for this is the very proposition he is trying to
disprove. Using the latter meaning, if A is B, then (by modus tollens) A is not
potentially B. Again, it would be question begging for Go ´ mez-Lobo simply to
assert otherwise. Neither meaning makes it true both that A is potentially B and
that A is B.
29 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in note 5 above, p. 261.
30 A number of commentators have made a distinction between intrinsic and con-
ferred moral standing, although this terminology is not uniformly used. See, e.g.,
Engelhardt, cited in note 23 above, pp. 104–109, 116; Roger Wertheimer, ‘‘Philos-
ophy on Humanity,’’ in Robert L. Perkins, ed., Abortion: Pro and Con (Cambridge,
MA: Schenkman, 1974), pp. 107–128; Ronald M. Green, ‘‘Conferred Rights and the
Fetus,’’ Journal of Religious Ethics 2 (1974): 55–75.
31 See S. I. Benn, ‘‘Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons,’’ in The Problem
of Abortion, 2d ed., ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984), pp. 135–144,
at 143; Joel Feinberg, ‘‘Potentiality, Development, and Rights,’’ in Problem of
Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg, pp. 145–150, at 149; Mary Anne Warren, ‘‘The Moral
Signiﬁcance of Birth,’’ Hypatia 4 (1989): 46–65, at 56–57; Green, cited in note 30
above; Jane English, ‘‘Abortion and the Concept of a Person,’’ Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 5 (1975): 233–243, at 241; Engelhardt, cited in note 23 above, p. 117;
Carson Strong, Ethics in Reproductive and Perinatal Medicine: A New Framework
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 53–62.
32 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in note 5 above, p. 261.
33 My argument draws upon comments by Dean Stretton, ‘‘Essential Properties and
the Right to Life: A Resonse to Lee,’’ Bioethics 18 (2004): 264–282, at 269–270.
34 George and Go ´ mez-Lobo, cited in note 5 above, p. 262.
35 Authors who appear to have something like this in mind include: Green, cited in
note 30 above; Bernard Gert, The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for
Morality (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1973); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
36 Commentators who seem to take an approach along this line include: Engelhardt,
cited in note 23 above; Strong, cited in note 31 above.
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